Animadversions Upon the Concept of Distance Education as a Discipline
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The article examines the basis upon which claims for discipline status might be justified, identifying four extrinsic and three intrinsic characteristics of disciplines. The former cover (a) structural characteristics (chairs and departments), (b) activities (teaching and research), (c) relevance to real and immediate problems, and (d) public recognition as a discipline; the latter the characteristics of (a) autonomy, internal cohesion, specialisation by subject (that is, by knowledge domain), and independence from other areas of academic endeavour, (b) the theoretical and conceptual depth and structure of the field, and (c) the presence of a “culture” that is particular to the discipline.
Status as a discipline can not be established on the basis of extrinsic characteristics. Although the presence of a conceptual structure particular to a discipline would be sufficient to establish discipline status, even acknowledged disciplines occasionally lack such a structure. The autonomy of the subject area and its character as a specialised field and the presence of a distinctive disciplinary culture are the most important arguments in favour of discipline status. While distance education shares many of the extrinsic characteristics of disciplines, it lacks autonomy and independence from education, and an independent disciplinary culture, and hence can not be regarded as a discipline in its own right.
Dans cette étude l’auteur analyse les fondements qui pourraient justifier la prétention au titre de discipline en identifiant sept caracteristiques de disciplines dont quatre sont extrinsèques. Les quatre premières comprennent (a) les caractéristiques structurelles (direction et départements), (b) les activités (enseignement et recherche), (c) la pertinence è des problèmes réels immédiats, et (d) la reconnaissance publique en tant que discipline; les trois dernières caractéristiques (a) I’autonomie, la cohésion interne, la spécialisation par matières (c’est-a-dire par domaine de connaissance), et l’independance vis-à-vis d’autres préoccupations disciplinaires, (b) I’approfondissement théorique et conceptuel et la structure du domaine, et (c) la présence d’une culture particulière reliée au domaine disciplinaire.
Le statut en tant que discipline ne peut pas s’établir à partir de caractéristiques extrinsèques. Il est vrai que la présence d’une structure conceptuelle se rapportant a la discipline suffirait a etablir le statut de discipline. Toutefois, une telle structure peut faire défaut dans les disciplines reconnues. L’autonomie de la matière et sa réputation de domaine spécialisé (caractérisé par son indépendance par rapport à d’autres disciplines) et la présence d’une culture disciplinaire distinctive forment les raisonnements les plus importants en faveur du statut de discipline. Bien que la formation à distance partage un grand nombre des caractéristiques extrinsèques des disciplines, il lui manque l’autonomie et l’indépendance de l’enseignement, et une culture disciplinaire indépendante, aussi ne saurait-elle etre reconnue en tant que discipline en soi.
Distance education has developed so much in the last fifteen years that some scholars claim it to be a discipline in its own right (Holmberg, 1987). The case for this assertion rests largely on developments in the field: research in distance education, new structures of distance education, attempts to develop a theory of distance education, the growth of a research-based literature on distance education and journals devoted to distance education, and the development of consultancy services, programmes of professional courses and postgraduate degrees in distance education (Holmberg, 1982; Kaufman, 1984; Willmott and King, 1984; South Australian College of Advanced Education). Some of these developments, however, are not new. For example, there.were journals devoted to correspondence education or home studies and associations of “correspondence” educators at national and international level long before the term distance educalion became commonplace.
It is accepted that there are some 50-60 basic disciplines and professional fields, with all the major subjects (biology, physics, law, medicine, etc.) divided into five or more specialities. Within a discipline, there is a tendency for specialities to distance themselves from other specialities—a feature which arises from the fact that the “leading-edge, knowledge-led” nature of specialities tends towards increased autonomy and differentiation (Clark, 1983, 13-15). This in turn explains the tendency, noticable during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for the number of recognised disciplines to increase. At the same time, areas of study dependent on “foundation disciplines” have also developed: thus, the foundation disciplines of education are said to be psychology, sociology, philosophy and history of education (Hills,1982,106).
Therefore, in determining whether distance education is in fact a discipline, we need to assess the validity of the arguments deployed in favour of granting discipline status to distance education. These arguments divide into two categories: (1) those whch focus on the essential nature, constitution or characteristics of disciplines (intrinsic arguments) and (2) those which are extraneous to disciplines (extrinsic). These arguments seem to be:
( 1 ) Intrinsic
(2) Extrinsic
Moreover, it is worthwhile considering what is meant by “defining a discipline.” Definitions can be of two types: a descriptive definition explains what a discipline is—possibly by reference to the intrinsic or extrinsic characteristics of a discipline; a stipulative definition implies that someone proposes what a discipline is (“A discipline, as I understand it, is ...”) and then develops the argument from that point, with a view to seeing where the argument leads. The discussion which follows is couched in terms of descriptive definitions. The stipulative approach, while useful in certain cases, does not help in deciding whether or not distance education is a discipline, since it is precisely the assertion that is in question.
A somewhat different approach to the problem is to eschew definitions and suggest criteria or standards against which the discipline- like status of particular subjects can be judged. A criterion is a guide rather than a precise measure, so that we can say that “something comes close to the criterion” and is therefore acceptable as a discipline. By establishing criteria, we can match a subject against our criteria and see how close to their demands it comes. If the arguments advanced in this paper are correct, then any discipline must have most if not all of the intrinsic characteristics referred to above. Extrinsic characteristics are insufficient to grant discipline status to distance education.
None of the four main extrinsic arguments advaneed above is a eonvineing reason for asserting that distance education is a diseipline, although most of the extrinsie eharaeteristics would be evident if distance edueation were a diseipline on intrinsic grounds.
The argument that the existence of organisational units devoted to the study and teaching of distance education supports the case for regarding distance education as a discipline confuses the concepts of a discipline with the way in which the work of academic subject experts is organised within the enterprise (university, college, etc.). At the higher education level, academic enterprises are organised at the lowest level into chairs or departments. In some some cases, a direct correlation exists between a disci~pline and a department organisation, in the sense that members of the organisational unit identify with a common discipline. In other cases, this correlation is much weaker. Some departments concentrate on a specialism within a discipline (e.g., International Law), or they may relate to an area of studies which is inter- or multi-disciplinary (e.g., Department of American Studies). It is the nature of the subject matter taught and researched by members of the department, and, in particular, the nature of the subject matter viz a viz the structure of knowledge, that determines whether a particular department is co- terminous with a discipline.
Thus, the existence of a Department of Distance Education is not in itself a sufficient condition to establish distance education as a discipline, just as the existence of a Department of American Studies would not be sufficient to establish the existence of a discipline of American Studies. This suggests that departments and chairs are in some sense extrinsic to disciplines, even though most (iisciplines will have them.
One criterion for discipline status is research in and teaching of distance education. Thus Holmberg argues that a discipline of distance education exists since “[i]t can be described both in terms of research programs and in terms of curricula for university study” (1986a, 29; 1986b, 139). However, the fact that a subject is researched and taught may not in itself mean that it is a discipline. Recognised specialisms within disciplines have the characteristic that they are taught and researched, but this is not sufficient for them to be regarded as disciplines. Similarly, a department may be established to carry out cross disciplinary research and teaching - but, by definition, such a department is not a discipline. Once again, it is the nature of the subject matter and its relationship to the structure of knowledge that determines whether what is being researched and taught is a discipline, not the existence of research programmes.
Sparkes (1983, 181) suggests that an academic discipline must have a degree of relevance to real and immediate problems. He argues that this might be judged by the number of students studying the subject; the number of other disciplines that apply, use or build upon its theories and data; the range of key concepts and theories characteristic of the subject; and the number of specialisms it embraces.
He says that there is no threshold value whieh must be exeeeded, but all must be in the plural and the wider the relevanee the better.
This argument, however, eonfuses extrinsie eharaeteristies such as the number of students studying a subjeet with intrinsie eharaeteristies relating to the eoneeptual and theoretieal basis of the diseipline. Further, relevance to real and immediate problems may be a characteristic of disciplines, but it is also a eharaeteristie of other areas of knowledge whieh are not diseiplines (e.g., Development Studies).
It eould be argued that if a suffieiently large number of aeademies believed that distanee edueation were a discipline, then it would be one. Some academics certainly subscribe to this view, but many of those who are directly concerned in evaluation and research into distance education do not. While the proportion of aeademies who support the diseipline status of distance education is probably not very great, the extent to which there is agreement on the status of distanee edueation among aeademies eould be established by a Delphi study. Sueh a study would eonsider the views of aeademies in other fields, as well as specialists in distance education, since recognition as a discipline must imply acceptance as such by the general community of scholars. However, a widespread belief that distance education was a discipline would probably only arise if there were grounds for this belief. This suggests that one must establish the case for discipline status on intrinsic grounds.
The way in which knowledge is divided into diseiplines is a subjeet for eonsiderable debate. Aristotle, for example, divided the diseiplines into three elasses: the theoretieal, eoneerned with knowing or understanding (mathematies, natural seiences); the practical, concerned with doing (politics, ethies, and edueation); and the produetive, eoncerned with making and creating (engineering, fine arts, productive arts). A rather different structure is suggested by Smith (1965, 140), who proposed a five-fold division of knowledge into the formal sciences (logic, mathematics); the inorganic sciences (physics, inorganie chemistry); the biologieal seiences (zoology, botany); the hominological sciences (psychology, soeiology); and the ideologieal seienees (history, ethics).
Each attempt to organise knowledge can be faulted because inevitably there are no neat categories or eriteria whieh ean be applied to the task of dividing knowledge into parts. The first argument advaneed below stems from a eonsideration of the basis upon whieh knowledge is organised or divided, ineluding faetors sueh as autonomy, speeialisation by subjeet domain, eohesion, and dependenee or independenee upon other diseiplines. The seeond is based upon questions related to the presenee or absenee of theory and eoneeptual depth and strueture. The third is based upon the belief that these divisions are reflected in disciplinary “cultures’‘.
Perhaps the most important argument in favour of discipline status is the one based on the argument from autonomy.
The first task is to try to define autonomy. The argument that a field of enquiry is a discipline if it is autonomous can be illustrated in respect of history (Elton, 1967, 8-12). History is the study of the past in the light of present evidence. Many of the social sciences also enquire into the past as well as the present of man — archaeology, anthropology, and sociology—but these subjects are distinct from history and from each other in the questions they address and the peculiar methods they use. History is autonomous in that it deals with matters which are peculiar to itself: it is concerned with events, with change, and with the particular. History deals with events, not states—with things that happen, not with things that are. In this sense, it is different to archaeology, which describes states (i.e., the physical evidence of the past). The historian’s interest in events differs from that of the sociologist, in that the latter is interested in extracting static conclusions from the study of events to establish how things (people, institution, ideas) change from one state to another. Finally historians treat events not as unique events but as particular. Facts and events are individual and particular—like other entities of a similar kind, but never entirely identical with them. Hence events are treated as individual to themselves, but “linked and rendered comprehensible by kinship, by common possessions, by universal qualities present in differing proportions and arrangements” (Elton, 1967,11). Thus, for example, particular revolutions tend to share characteristics which are in some sense common to all revolutions, and hence universal.
Fields of enquiry that are not autonomous have difficulty in justifying claims to discipline status. For example, some specialisms within a discipline may acquire many of the characteristics of a discipline (Becher, 1981, 119), but even fragmented disciplines, e.g., biology, are held together by the numerous areas of overlap between specialisms and the presence of shared guiding principles, e.g., evolutionary theory (Becher, 1981,115).
Distance education, therefore, lacks autonomy for three reasons. First, the subject matter with which distance education deals (as opposed to its methods) is not intrinsically different to that of education as a whole. To the extent that there is a difference, it may stem more from the fact that distance education, as discussed in this paper, more often refers to adult rather than children’s education. The result is that many of the differences between theories of distance and conventional education stem from the view that the adult is psychologically so different from the child that the attitudes and techniques of adult educators have to be different to those of child educators (a view which has led to the distinction between andragogy and pedagogy). This suggests that the reference from education back to the foundation discipline of educational psychology will be different depending upon whether one is educating adults or children. But, crucially, educators concerned with both branches of education will refer back to educational psychology, so that the psychological theories and concepts used by educators will be similar, irrespective of the branch of education in which they are working and the means (distance or face-to-face teaching) that they are using. Second, the methodology by which academics investigate distance education differs little from those employed by other behavioral scientists, including “conventional educationalists.’‘ Third, there is no widespread evidence that “distance educators” actually feel themselves to be separate from “conventional educators.”
Against this there is the fact that the number of disciplines has grown, that many disciplines are now divided into specialities, and that new disciplines do emerge. This begs the question of the cohesiveness of a discipline or subject area. Within a subject area, the degree of cohesion among the various subject experts vary. Some disciplines are highly structured while others “are characterised by lack of agreement on what knowledge content is basic and how it ought to be taught” (Clark, 1983, 39). Departments operating within well developed bodies of knowledge (i.e., with a strong discipline base) can arrive at a consensus far more readily than those where the knowledge base is vague, ambiguous or conflicting (ibid, 40). An outward manifestation of cohesion is the degree to which, within the discipline, academics share ‘‘idols” with other experts in their subject (Einstein in Physics, Weber or Marx in Sociology), a common vocabulary (jargon), and perspectives and technical approaches which set them aside from those who are outside the field (ibid, 77-9). Nevertheless, individual disciplines tolerate considerable differences in approach (e.g., the differences between theoretical and experimental physicists, and methodological and philosophical divisions among biologists) while remaining a recognisable and coherent discipline (c.f. Becher, 1981, 116- 17). The outward manifestations of cohesion is the disciplinary culture—a point to which we shall return.
Cohesion within a discipline generally implies that there is agreement about what should be taught since there is widespread agreement that a discipline “specializes by subject, that is by knowledge domain” (Clark, 1983, 29) and “the educational significance of the notion of the structure of the disciplines resides in the direct and practical effect it has upon planning and structuring curricula” (Finegold and Connelly, 1985, 1414). Of course, there may be wide ideological differences between members of a discipline which come to the fore in the determination of course content. Conversely, members of a discipline often are clear about what constitutes a legitimate curriculum.
In making the case for considering distance education as a discipline, Holmberg (1986a, 28; 1986b, 137) proposed a “reasonably articulated structure of the discipline of distance education’‘ encompassing “philosophy and theory; distance students, their milieu, conditions and study motivation; subject- matter presentation; communication and interaction between students and their supporting organisation (tutors, counsellors, administrators, other students); administration and organisation; economics; systems (comparative distance education, typologies, evaluation, etc.); history of distance education.” The problem with this proposal is that it explores the field of distance education from a variety of viewpoints, each informed by the perspectives and technical approaches of disciplines or specialities such as sociology, communications, economics, systems, and history. Students taking such a course of study would of necessity have to grapple with the perspectives, techniques, theories and jargon (i.e., the culture) of a range of disciplines which are the ‘‘foundation disciplines’‘ of distance education. In other words, distance education is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry.
Another reason why Holmberg’s disciplinary structure is unsatisfactory is that it ignores the distinction between knowledge within and knowledge aboul a discipline. The history of distance education is not the same thing as a discipline of distance education, just as the history of music is not the same thing as music for the reason that it conveys knowledge about music rather than knowledge within music. However, the issue begs the question of the relationship between a discipline and its foundation disciplines which can be usefully illustrated in respect of education.
This issue can usefully be approached by analysing the nature of educational theory. Hirst (1983, 5) argues that educational theory primarily “seeks to develop rational principles for educational practice.’‘ This is, I suggest, also true of a theory of distance education. Hirst says that to do this, educational theory draws upon all the theoretical knowledge available in the social sciences, including the knowledge available in educational psychology, sociology of education, history of education and philosophy of education, which are sub-areas of psychology, sociology, history and philosophy respectively. However, these foundation disciplines of education have radically different characters and limited significance “in the formulation of practical principles” governing educational practice.
Each discipline, even when concerned with educational practice, clearly has its own concepts, employing these to ask its own distinctive theoretical questions, questions that are essentially, say, philosophical, psychological or historical in nature and not practical. The conclusions reached in each area, however focused on matters of educational practice, are again philosophical, psychological or historical in character and are not themselves principles for practice. The disciplines cannot tackle any given practical questions as such for each tackles questions which are peculiar to itself, those that can be raisedonly within its own distinctive conceptual apparatus... The disciplines each make their own limited abstractions from the complexities of practice. They tackle no common problems of any kind and none of them is adequate to the proper determining of principles for educational practice. Indeed, there seems an inevitable gap between the conceptual framework within which the issues of practice arise and the conceptual frameworks the distinct disciplines employ for their particular purposes (Hirst,1983,5-6).
Hirst goes on to argue that rational educational practice starts from “a consideration of current practice, the rules and principles it actually embodies and the knowledge, beliefs and principles that the practitioners employ in characterising that practice and deciding what ought to be done” (ibid, 16). In some circumstances neither the practitioner nor an outsider will be able ‘‘to provide a satisfactory explicit rationale for an action or activity” (p.17) since:
—rational action can precede and to some extent must precede rational principles, so that, following Ryle (1949), there is a distinction between ’know how’ and ’know that’. Not all intelligent ’know how’ presupposes that the person possesses the ’know that’ of the relevant principles (pp.10- 11).
—following Polanyi (1975), any activity of understanding or doing involves both conscious knowledge and tacit knowledge, but even if the latter is analysed, an element remains tacit and in a sense unknowable (pp.13- 14).
Analysing educational practice leads to the development of what Hirst (1983, 16-17) calls an “operational educational theory” which ‘‘sets out the elements of practice, belief and principles that are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible to overt rational criticism.’‘ Out of this operational theory, and validated by the practice upon which it is based, comes a practical theory of education which is itself embedded in an environment and validated by an environment informed by a wider context of knowledge, beliefs, and values that are the subject of other disciplines.
In relation to practical affairs [of which education is one] . . . it is the job of such disciplines as psychology, sociology, and philosophy to provide a context of ever more rationally defensible beliefs and values for the development and practical testing of practical principles (p.19).
The foundation disciplines do not themselves, however, provide a rationale for any particular educational practice, but do, from their distinctive viewpoints, provide appropriate forms of criticism of significance in the formulation and testing of practical principles of educational theory.
From this Hirst concludes that a theory of education is independent of the theories of the foundation disciplines, just as a theory in physics is independent of the mathematical principles which it utilises (p. 20). Equally, it follows that a theory of distance education is independent of the foundation disciplines used to explore practice in distance education. The fact that a subject area has foundation disciplines does not in itself preclude that subject area from attaining discipline status (as in the case of physics). What does not follow is that distance education is itself independent of the more general field of education. Whether or not it depends on the nature of its theory and concepts, and the methodology and culture of those who study and practice distance education as opposed to conventional education.
Sparkes (1983,181) argues that an academic discipline must have its own theoretical and conceptual depth, and its own conceptual structure (i.e., “there must be a complex set of interrelationships between its fundamental ideas”). The question then arises whether distance education is a discipline in this sense. Evidence thaf there is a theory of distance education might form a basis for such a judgement and gives weight to the search for such a theory.
To satisfy Sparkes, a theory would need to have conceptual and theoretical depth, that is, at the most superficial level, empirical generalisations or ’laws’ which are true within specified limitations (e.g., Boyle’s law in physics); at the next level, explanations of these laws in terms of abstract concepts (e.g., Kinetic theory or atomic theory in physics); and at the deepest level, those theories which express relationships between these abstract concepts (e.g., thermodynamics or relativity in physics). He concludes that “an area of intellectual interest that concerns itself mainly with nothing deeper than empirical generalisations or that only deploys theories from other disciplines tends not to be acceptable as an academic discipline” (ibid.,182).
Finally, Sparkes considers that the “unequivocal test for a discipline is whether it has developed its own paradigms” (1983, 182). These he defines as “the core theories that those within the discipline (the disciples) accept as proven, and which they protect, in the face of contrary evidence, by auxiliary theories’‘ (p.182). He admits that few disciplines have their own paradigms and so acquire unequivocal recognition as a discipline. It is clear that distance education is nowhere near this stage of development. Indeed, it seems doubtful that it ever could be. In view of this, it is probably only necessary to consider whether distance education has developed to the point at which there are either empirical generalisations or ’laws’ which are true within specified limitations or, at the next level, explanations of these laws often in terms of abstract concepts or ‘‘deep theories’‘ expressing the relationship between abstract concepts.
It seems clear from the literature that distance education has developed to a point at which there are some theories which have general status in the sense that they both explain and predict cause and effect in the practice of distance education (c.f. Holmberg, 1986b, 123-8; Perraton, 1987, 4-10). There are also a number of other statements which Perraton refers to as ’generalisations’ which fall short of theories in the sense that they can both explain and predict. Perraton’s distinction between theory and generalisation is derived from
“Runciman’s (1983) discussion of the relations between theory, generalisation and practice in the social sciences. He distinguishes three meanings for the term ’understanding’. In its first sense, understanding answers the question ’what is happening?’ and, in his terminology, concerns reporatage. In the second sense, understanding demands an answer to the question ’why?’ and is concerned with explanation. In the third sense it involves answering the question ’what is it really like’ and so requires description... Runciman goes on to claim that in its first sense, in the realm of reportage, we can produce generalisations but not theories; when we ask ’what is happening’ we are not asking a question that leads directly to theory. It is only in the second sense of the term ’understanding’, where we are seeking explanation, that we can develop falsifiable and predictive theoretical statements.” (Perraton,1987,4)
For Perraton (p.4), the literature of distance education is strong on reportage but weak on the generalisations that come out of reportage and inevitably, weaker on the development of understanding (i.e., theory), even at Sparkes’ most basis level. Indeed, Perraton argues that the limited number of theoretical statements that can be made about distance education “fall far short of being a single theory of distance education. Indeed, it is implicit in the argument that the search for such a theory is misconceived” (ibid., 4). Thus Perraton undermines Keegan’s hope that a theory of distance education would give “the foundation on which the structures of need, purpose and administration can be erected”, and which, when firmly based, will “provide the touchstone against which decisions - political, financial, educational, social - about distance education can be taken with confidence” (Keegan,1986,6).
Assuming that there is a theory of distance education, what kind of theory is it? Smith (1965, 63) suggests that a theory is “a plan for seeing, ordering, and speculating about various phenomena or experiences. A descriptive theory is a scheme for seeing and thinking about what is; a normative theory is a scheme for seeing and thinking about what ought to be.” Most who have tackled the question of theory in distance education assume that the theory should be predictive (cf. Sparkes,1983,186; Holmberg, 1986b,121-3; Perraton, 1987,4).
Holmberg’s “Steps on the path towards a theory of distance education” (Holmberg, 1986b,103-33) is probably the most sustained attempt to develop a theory of distance education. However, even Holmberg admits that it is not possible to develop a cast- iron predictive theory of either teaching (p.117) or distance teaching (p.123), because no theory can cover every eventuality (p.121) or be “universally applicable to all students, all conditions and all subject areas” (p.120). Nevertheless, Holmberg contends that a theory of distance education “may be expected to indicate and explain the consequences of the various procedures and media applied to target groups of various kinds and to various frame factors’‘ (p.121). On the basis of certain assumptions (p.122), Holmberg formulates a “normative teaching theory” for distance education. This theory “seems to have explanatory value’‘ (p.123) and is a “communications theory” that leads him to identify certain practices as “favourable to teaching, i.e. facilitative of learning” (p.123). Such practices include a style of presentation that is easily accessible, a high degree of readability of printed course materials, and quick handling of students’ assignments. These practices, which are all “fairly universally acceptable” (p.124), can be stated and then reformulated as hypotheses which have either been tested empirically and found true (e.g., Rekkedal’s work on the effects of reduced assignment turn-round time on students, 1983), or are capable of being tested. The fact that they can be expressed as hypotheses or predictions and tested in such a way that they can potentially be found to be false is necessary to establish the presence of a deductive theory (pp.115, 125, 128). Furthermore, the theory is more than a truism because “if a truism, the theory of teaching for distance education would be universally accepted,” and this is empirically not the case (p. 129).
Holmberg conceded that his ‘‘leaky theory” is not and can not be “deterministic” (p. 125). and that it ‘‘does not offer solutions to very specific teaching problems in distance education’ ’ (p.130). However, “it is not devoid of explanatory power: it does, in fact indicate essential characteristics of effective distance teaching’ ’ (p.125).
This is not the place to discuss the problems which are inherent in Holmberg’s analysis of his theory. One of the main objections must be that, because the theory is only partially predictive, it is possible that the effects which Holmberg is seeking to achieve may in fact result from causes other than those which he identified. If what we give as an explanation of an event does not rule out the possibility of the event failing to occur, then we can scarcely claim that we know why in that particular case it did occur: why, in that particular case, the possibility of its not occurring was not realised instead. It follows from this that the possibility of predicting the outcomes of particular distance teaching strategies is diminished, and hence that it is difficult for distance educators to bring about desirable outcomes with any certainty because they can not know what actions will lead to what outcomes.
This creates some problems for Sparkes. Sparkes does not say that distance education can never become a discipline; indeed, he argues that there is not only seope for sueh a diseipline, but a need for it. However, he believes that ‘‘professionals have to do more than explain and prediet sueeessfully and objeetively what is going to happen; they have to be able to take aetion to bring about desirable future events ’ ’ (1983,186).
There are two problems here. First, whether theories in bona fide diseiplines must be predietive. If predietive capacity is the test of a theory, then this would exclude what are commonly held to be theories in much of the humanities. Indeed, it is generally accepted that theories may be explanatory and non predictive. Historians, for example, aim at trying to show that an event in question was not a matter of chance but was to be expected given preceding events and general conditions. They seek to discover the conditions making possible what actually happened. They do not in general argue that because something happened in the past in such and such circumstances, then similar events will occur in the future given similar conditions.
Second, there is the whole relationship between theory, operational educational theory, and praetiee. The nature of a theory of distance education and its relationship to practice in distance education must be similar to that between edueational theory and praetiee. Further, it is what works in praetiee that is important. This must be the starting point for the development of a theory of distanee education. If a theory does not work in practice, and there is no guarantee that it will, then something else has to be tried.
It seems clear that there are a number of theories related to praetiee in distanee edueation, but no overarehing theory or eoneept of distanee edueation. Some of the theories are rather weak - what Perraton ealls generalisations in the sense that they have explanatory value derived from observations (reportage); others are stronger and have a (dubious) predietive value. The seareh for a general predictive theory of distance edueation whieh will somehow explain everything and establish distanee edueation as a (scientific) diseipline is a ehimera, in part beeause the existence of a predictive theory is not required to establish status as a discipline and in part developing sueh a theory is intrinsieally unlikely.
The faet that some diseiplines do not have predietive theories suggests that the existenee of a predietive theory is not a neeessary eondition to establish the presence of a discipline. However, in the case of distance education, the absence of a signifieant body of theory at a level higher than that of empirieal generalisations and the laek of a eoneeptual strueture that is truly independent of general edueational theory effeetively refutes any elaim that distanee edueation is an independent diseipline. Distanee edueation ean rightly elaim to be a special mode of edueational praetiee, with a distinetive body of (low level) theory supporting that praetiee. But that is all.
Diseiplines knit together experts or professionals in the same subjeet area— chemist with chemists, historians with historians. Significantly, diseiplines have an importance in the life and belief of the subject expert which extends beyond the enterprise within which the individual works. Many aeademies see themselves first and foremost as subjeet experts (e.g., historians or physieists), sharing a eraftlike community of interest with those fellow subject experts working in other institutions at a national and international level (Clark, 1983, 29), with whom they interact through the professional literature (journals), conferences and national associations, and by private correspondenee.
Becher (1981, 1987) shows that it is part of the nature of diseiplines that their practitioners share cultures with common linguistic features, in the sense that the way in which they indieate their taeit knowledge (in respeet of, for example, methodology, ‘‘folklore’‘ and “gossip’‘), the eharaeteristic terms of commendation and criticism which they employ, and the way in which their arguments are generated and developed, are shared. Equally, eommunieation between members of different disciplines can be full of misunderstandings and lead to unresolvable conflicts because there is no neutral terminology whieh will allow conflicts to be resolved (Becher, 1987, 262-6). To take one eonerete example, ’rigorous’ is a term of high praise in sociology, but a back-handed complement in physics where it implies a narrow, unimaginative employment of mathematics with no proper grounding in the physical world (ibid,264).
How members of a discipline communicate with each other also varies: historians, for example, place considerable value on the publication of a book; the reverse is the case in physics, where with the exception of textbooks, publication is done through journals; artieles by historians tend to be long whereas physieists’ eommunieations tend to be very short. In physies, knowledge is eumulative and highly structured and the modes of argumentation well-established; historieal knowledge is fluid and subject to individual interpretation and judgement; historians are more engaged with eraft and teehnique than with methodology and theory. Soeiologists are self-eonseious about the status of knowledge and about methodology and theory. Soeiologists are self-eonseious about the status of knowledge and about methodology and the status of teehniques in their field. Beeause there is no shared perspeetive, in soeiology eaeh argument has to establish its own perspeetive and shape its own strueture (ibid, 273).
While many of those eoneerned with distanee edueation have a eommon interest in the field, they may equally have an interest in what one might refer to as their foundation diseipline. There are relatively few people working in distance education who do not have a foundation in another diseipline - a fact which may well be reflected in the nature of mueh of the literature on distanee edueation (in Perraton’s terms, mostly reportage, some generalisation, little in the way of theory) and in the absenee of a strong sense among distanee edueators of their belonging to a discipline.
Although distance education has developed greatly in the last twenty years, there are no grounds for regarding it as an emerging or established new discipline.
A discipline, properly speaking, must be an autonomous area of academic inquiry in the sense that the questions it addresses and its methods are particular to itself. The subject experts working in a discipline will tend to have similar perceptions about the most important thinkers in their field and share a common language (jargon), perspectives and technical approach. They will generally agree on the important questions addresses by their discipline, and on the methods employed to answer them. Crucially, their field of inquiry will be independent of any ‘‘foundation disciplines,” and in addition will have intemal coherence as a domain of knowledge in its own right. In common with other disciplines and specialisms within disciplines, and in common with some interdisciplinary fields, they will deal with theories which may or may not encompass an over-arching theory but (except in a few disciplines) is unlikely to have its own paradigms. These theories may be, but need not be, predictive; they must be explanatory. They will, in common with those who work in interdisciplinary fields, teach and research, and as a result, share with those who work in disciplines the “paraphanalia” of the academic profession—journals, associations, conferences, chairs and departments. But, significantly, the latter characteristics are not intrinsic to the concept of a discipline, but are rather characteristics which are shared by many non-disciplines.
The grounds most commonly advanced in support of the case for regarding distance education as a discipline concentrate on the extrinsic features of disciplines—the presence of research and teaching programmes, the existence of chairs and departments, and the ‘‘paraphanalia” of the academic profession. There is no corpus of “deep level’‘ theory and methodology particular to distance education. There is a growing understanding of the practice of distance education and a corpus of “low level” theory, but its presence does not mean that distance education is a discipline. There is no sense in which there is a real disciplinary culture that is distinct from education as a whole. And there are no grounds for seeing distance education as a separate specialist domain of knowledge. It cannot be regarded as a discipline.
1 Included in the new structures category would be universities with mandates to teach at a distance, distance education research and development centres, (e.g., Institute of Educational Technology at the Open University, UK; Zentrales Institut fur Fernstudienforschung [ZIFF] at the FernUniversitat, West Germany; Distance Education Unit, Deakin University, Australia; Centre for Distance Education, Athabasca University, Canada), chairs in or related to distance education (FernUniversitat and Deakin University), associations of university distance educators and networks of distance education institutions at an international and national levels (e.g., Asociacion Iberoamericano de Educacion Superior a Distancia, the Asian Association of Open Universities, the European Association of Distance Teaching Universities and Canadian Association for Distance Education and the International Council for Distance Education).
2 Distance teaching universities and research and development centres have assisted in the expansion of this research base. Documentation centres at the Open University, the International Extension College, Deutsches Institut fur Fernstudien an der Universitat Tubingen (West Germany), and Universidad Nacional Abierta (Venezuela) have assisted with the compilation and dissemination of information on university-level distance education.
3 Teaching at a Distance UK, 1974-85; Distance Education Australia, 1980-; Journal of Distance Education Canada, 1986-; and American Journal of DistanceEducation USA 1987-.
4 Open University, UK; the International Extension College and the Universidad Estatal a Distancia, Costa Rica.
5 The Home Study Review [1960-67] and Epistolodidaktika [first published, 1964]
6 National University Extension Association of the United States of America and the European Home Study Council
7 Kiger’s (1971,99) comment that in the United States one of the more tangible factors in determining whether a subject is a discipline is the existence of a , national learned society and, of equal importance, whether the society is a member of one of the three national councils representing the broad areas of the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, concentrates on extrinsic rather than intrinsic factors, and is thus unacceptable as a sufficient condition to establish discipline status. While distance education shares many of the characteristics listed above, this is not enough to make it an academic discipline.
8 Indeed, historians are not necessarily looking for a causal relationship. In examining movements from state A to state B they may properly establish that A and B are linked by coincidence, coexistence, or mere temporal sequence, and while some historians do seek to exprain events through a general explanatory theory (e.g., linear and cyclical theories which seek to explain historical change), there is nothing in the nature of such explanations that makes one conclude that satisfactory explanations of the particular can not be given in the absence of general theories. (Of course, one could argue that ‘‘theories’‘ in history can never be more than “generalisations” because they can never be more than explanatory.)
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